



                                                
Plato’s Republic and Gray’s Value-Pluralism: A False 
Dichotomy? 
 




One of the most strident dichotomies in political thought is that between Platonic ethical 
monism and Grayan value-pluralism. The former seems to claim that only one way of life can 
ever be good, while the latter argues that there are many forms through which one can 
flourish. I argue, however, that this simplistic account fails fully to account for the nuances 
within both schemas. I engage philosophically with the two key works of Plato and Gray: the 
Republic2 and Two Faces of Liberalism. After outlining the philosophical background of the 
conflict between monism and pluralism in Plato and Gray, I identify aspects of the Republic 
which are commonly held to be archetypes of ethical monism, namely the ‘Good’, the 
Kallipolis and the rule of the philosopher, and attempt to demonstrate their compatibility with 
the apparently pluralistic aspects of Two Faces of Liberalism. The argument I develop 
suggests that, fundamentally, aspects of value-pluralism remain prominent within Plato, and 
aspects of ethical monism remain prominent within Gray. I suggest that it is difficult and, 
perhaps, unhelpful to maintain the dichotomy, and propose instead that we regard the two 




The identification of the good as a Form3 by Plato in the Republic4 appears to 
necessitate ethical monism. That is, the Good is singular and homogeneous in nature, 
at least in its true state. A seemingly natural inference from this is that there can be 
only one way to live a genuinely ‘good’ life - one which participates5 in the Form of 
the Good. John Gray, on the other hand, grounds his philosophy in value-pluralism. 
This amounts to the belief that 
 
There are many forms of life in which humans can thrive. Among these there 
are some whose worth cannot be compared… The most fundamental value-
pluralist claim is that there are many conflicting kinds of human flourishing, 
some of which cannot be compared in value. Among the many kinds of good 
lives that humans can live there are some that are neither better nor worse than 
one another, nor the same in worth, but incommensurably – that is to say, 
 
1 School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK. 
2 When referring to the Republic, I use the Grube/Reeve (1997) translation. For references to all other 
dialogues, I also use those in Cooper, ed. 1997.  Plato: Complete Works. 
3 For a discussion of the nature of Forms, or ‘Ideas’, and the Form of the Good in the Republic, see the 
section entitled ‘The Platonic Good and Grayan Flourishing’. Also see Penner (2006, 234-262) for a 
general introduction to Platonic Forms. A more specific discussion of the Good is included in (Irwin 
1977, 224-226). For an analysis of the theory in all of Plato’s dialogues see Moravcsik (1992, 55-92) 
and Melling (1987, 96-124). 
4 Republic (VI: 505a, 508d-e). 
5 I will discuss Plato’s system of ‘participation’ (μέθεξις) and its impact on Platonic pluralism in sub-




                                                
differently – valuable. Even so, there may be good reasons for preferring some 
incommensurable goods over others (Gray 2000, 5-6). 
 
He argues that there is no one outstanding value which promotes the greatest level of 
‘flourishing’6 amongst all humans in all circumstances. Each individual, or, more 
usually, group may hold different values; for example, honour, friendship and 
honesty. However, experience appears to demonstrate that, despite following differing 
values, these groups can still ‘flourish’, even if that is achieved in seemingly distinct 
ways. Therefore, no value can be said abstractly to be the most effective in achieving 
flourishing in every circumstance or situation. If individuals accept what Gray terms 
the ‘truth of pluralism’ there need be no conflict between these peoples. As Gray puts 
it: ‘Where such ways of life are rivals, there is no one of them that is best. People who 
belong to different ways of life need have no disagreement. They may simply be 
different’ (Gray 2000, 5).  
 
The mere suggestion that Gray and Plato, with such apparently disparate 
positions on the nature of the good and just, could share some common ground seems, 
prima facie, unlikely. Indeed, Gray7 (2000, 4) views value-pluralism as a critique of 
Platonic monism, claiming that: 
 
Ancient pluralism found few echoes in Greek philosophy. The founders of 
European ethical theory were monists. Neither Plato nor Aristotle was in any 
doubt that one way of life was best for humankind. Whether the good for 
humans was finally one, as Plato imagined, or many, as Aristotle was 
sometimes ready to admit, the best kind of life was the same for everyone – 
even though they never doubted that it could be lived fully only by a few 
leisured Greek males. In this classical view, conflicting judgements about the 
human good are symptoms of error. For the founders of European ethical 
theory, as for the Christians who came after them, conflicts of value were 
signs of imperfection, not a normal part of ethical life.  
 
This notion is apparently confirmed by the ‘other perspective’ of Plato, in the 
Republic, with his indisputably high opinion of philosophers: 
 
Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading 
men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and 
philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue 
either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no 
rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. (Rep. V: 473c-d) 
 
However, in this paper I argue that the society which Plato creates for his 
utopian city, the Kallipolis, is not monistic. I base this view on the fact that not 
everyone in the polis is a philosopher as not all have the innate ability to philosophise 
 
6 For a discussion of ‘flourishing’ in Gray see the section entitled ‘The Platonic Good and Grayan 
Flourishing’. 
7 The progenitor of value-pluralism, Isaiah Berlin (1969, 167-172), is similarly dismissive of Plato, 




                                                
and, therefore, rule. In reality, Plato appears perfectly willing to accept Gray’s (2000, 
6) ‘fact of pluralism’. In his utopia, he outlines three classes: the money-making 
artisans; the spirited auxiliary guardians; and the rational philosopher guardians (Rep. 
IV: 434c). This is roughly a macrocosmos to his microcosmos of the ideal soul, which 
is constituted by the appetitive, the spirited and the rational parts. Similarly, I argue 
that Gray cannot logically hope to present himself as a pure pluralist, so long as he is 
willing to use such terms as ‘flourishing’ in the way he does. 
 
With these challenges to the traditional perspectives of both thinkers in mind, I 
wish to examine Plato’s pluralistic tendencies; to demonstrate the manner in which 
these are encapsulated in the Kallipolis; and to show how this ideal system can be 
perceived as an example of Grayan modus vivendi; that is, a system in which 
individuals or groups with different and sometimes conflicting values, can co-exist. 
This will also necessitate an examination of Gray, investigating whether he can claim 
that there is no meta-value of good, if indeed he does so. I shall accomplish the 
investigation in three ways. Firstly, I will examine the nature of the Good for both 
Plato and Gray. This will develop into a discussion of the system of interaction 
between immaterial Forms, and their corresponding material objects; as Plato terms it, 
‘participation’. Secondly, I will investigate the heterogeneous four virtues of the soul, 
the way that all are said to contribute to the good, and how they correspond to the 
city. Finally, I will expound the plurality of the Kallipolis, and show, with reference to 
‘justice’, how this system can be utilised as an example of modus vivendi. This will be 
put into context through a discussion of the degenerate forms of government 
discussed by Plato, in books eight and nine, and why they simply cannot be justified, 
sustained or regarded as ‘good’. Before this, however, I need to make several 
qualifications. 
 
Firstly, I do not intend to argue that Plato and Gray belong to the same ethical 
lineage. They are genealogically distinct, as Gray himself emphasises (2000, 4). I 
simply wish to demonstrate that there are aspects in each schema which are 
compatible and can be discussed in similar terms. There are also possibilities for both 
to inform – particularly normative – aspects of the other. Secondly, I focus primarily 
on Gray as an exemplar of a more ‘comprehensive’ value-pluralism. While I use 
‘value-pluralist/m’ to refer to Gray’s schema, many of the points I make are 
applicable to the genre of value-pluralism found in such thinkers as Berlin, Raz and 
Crowder. There are points at which I refer to these other thinkers where Gray is silent 
on aspects of Plato’s theory. I hope that this leads to an opening up, and development 
of, not only Plato’s thought but also that of Gray and other pluralists. Part of the 
reason for this focus is that I do not wish my analysis to follow the same line of 
reasoning as that of the likes of Griswold (1999), 8 who attempts to demonstrate not 
only that Plato saw pluralism as beneficial but also that he propagated liberalism and 




8 Similar arguments, though generally more focused on Socrates’ dialectical style, are outlined by 




                                                
I agree with Griswold (1999, 105) that much of Plato’s schema can be 
described, ‘following Rawls’, as ‘perfectionism’, and indeed this will form the basis 
for much of my argument; value-pluralism being fundamentally perfectionist. As 
Griswold (1999, 105) argues, perfectionism, as described by Rawls, is ‘…a 
teleological theory, namely, one in which the realization of human excellence is taken 
as the good’. Here, it is Plato’s conflation of the good and the just which determines 
his perfectionism. He regards justice as the apparent aim of all humans, being a 
prerequisite for actualising the Good, and the soul’s natural state (Vlastos 1978, 66-
95). Indeed, there are arguments that Plato considers justice to be not simply a 
prerequisite of actualising good, but also good in itself.9 Despite this, I choose Gray 
as a pluralist who, almost uniquely, believes liberalism to be only one form of modus 
vivendi appropriate only to certain circumstances. Griswold believes that the kind of 
schema and societal structure proposed by Plato, typified by the Kallipolis, are 
‘objectionable propositions’ (Griswold 1999, 109) and that it is impossible to argue 
that he could have thought that ‘a totalitarian, soul-crushing political regime did 
justice to the human condition’ (1999, 109). He seems to think that it is as unjust for 
the philosophers to be forced to rule, as it would be for the other classes. He also 
cannot believe that Plato would promote a city in which the majority were not 
balanced enough to rule themselves and were intrinsically unjust. He openly describes 
the polis as ‘inegalitarian and illiberal’ (1999, 115). Griswold’s replacement theory 
hinges on the idea that the Kallipolis was never intended by Plato to be a real world 
system, that the decline of the systems, starting in Book VIII (Rep. VIII-X), 
demonstrates that the Kallipolis is unsustainable, and that it was only ever intended to 
be a ‘polis-in-speech’ (Griswold 1999, 114). He claims that the ‘first best regime is 
unavailable’ (1999, 115) and that the ‘second best regime’ could not possibly imitate 
the ‘unobtainable ideal’ (1999, 116). Liberalism and democracy, he argues, provide 
the best possible alternative, citing a Socratic quotation (Griswold 1999, 116) that 
claims 
 
Because it contains all kinds of constitutions on account of the license it gives 
its citizens... it looks as though anyone who wants to put a city in order, as we 
were doing, should probably go to a democracy. (Rep. VIII: 557d) 
 
The allowance for the philosopher to rule, instead of being ruled, and to philosophise 
even outside of government is argued by Griswold to be a reason to look at liberal 
democracy as a viable starting point for a Kallipolis. While I agree with his 
conclusion of Platonic perfectionism, and that the self-interest of self-perfection is 
also conducive to community perfection, I find his argument that Plato sees self rule 
as the only way to achieve this open to great criticism, some of which I will elucidate 
in the paper. His flagrant disregard of the Kallipolis on the grounds that it could never 
be fully actualised is similarly problematic, as it is, nevertheless, an embodiment of 
Plato’s ethics. 
 
With these qualifications in mind, I shall now discuss the nature of the ‘Good’ 
for both Plato and Gray. 
 
 




                                                
The Platonic ‘Good’ and Grayan ‘Flourishing’ 
 
For Plato, unlike many modern philosophers, the Good is an objective, almost 
tangible ‘thing’ - a Form. We, or at least Socrates, can therefore make some 
inferences about its nature. The Forms, for Plato, are not part of our ‘sensible world’. 
Instead they exist in a higher, more ‘real’ ‘intelligible world’, perceptible only 
through dialectic and pure intellection. They are homogeneous, atemporal paradigms 
or universals.10 Plato discusses the Forms in the Phaedo,11 a middle dialogue, and 
Parmenides12, a late dialogue, in which he apparently admits only Forms of 
mathematical, aesthetic and ethical qualities. However, in the Republic (X: 596a-
597d), he takes the leap of allowing for all objects and ideas to have a generic, 
immaterial Form, providing the example of tables and beds. Forms are discussed and 
described in several dialogues, including those mentioned, in often disparate and even 
conflicting ways. This has led to a great deal of controversy about which schema 
Plato really intended. For my purposes, I shall focus on the account in the Republic, as 
this relates most directly to my current concerns. 
 
While the Good is a Form, or at least Form-like, it is separate from the rest, 
and ‘higher’ in some way. Its relationship to the other Forms seems almost causal. In 
the Republic, before the allegory of the cave, he uses the Sun13 as an analogy for the 
Good. While it is perceptible only to the most perfect philosopher like the rest of the 
Forms, it seems to exist above them as well. The objects outside the cave represent 
the ‘lesser Forms’, while the Sun, that is the Good, causes both their being known and 
their existence. As Socrates puts it, just as the Sun creates life and allows it to be seen, 
 
you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge [the Forms] owe 
their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the 
good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power (Rep. 509b). 
 
However, while the Form of the Good exists separately from the rest, its 
characteristics can similarly be perceived within the sensible world, even if that is, 
instrumentally, as a result of other Forms. 
 
For Gray, ethically, an objective good exists, though perhaps not in such a 
distinct form. While groups may pursue differing, and perhaps conflicting, values, he 
still appears to regard ‘flourishing’ almost as a measuring stick for lives (Gray 2000, 
21). If there is no meta-value of ‘good’ or ‘flourishing’, there can be no discussion of 
a particular life as being ‘good’ or producing ‘flourishing’. I contend that there is 
reason to believe that Gray’s schema requires simply that one follow a value which 




10 Whether the Forms are universals or paradigms has proved a great source of controversy with many 
implications, and I  discuss this, briefly, later. 
11 Phaedo (74a-75d, 100c-101c). 
12 A description of, together with arguments for and against, participation is present throughout the 
Parmenides. 




                                                
The condition of flourishing is employed vaguely and without explicit 
definition. In certain places it is granted a functional value, as with ‘justice’14 for 
Plato. However, in others, it is used to denote success or a psychological condition 
akin to that of utility. It is often difficult to elicit how Gray understands his claim that 
different societies are ‘flourishing’ or ‘thriving’ (Gray 2000, 21). The most logical 
possibility is that he equates this to the pertinence of chosen values to 
‘circumstance’,15 and the individual’s/group’s subsequent success in their application. 
In certain cases we may be able to comprehend our circumstances and make informed 
choices as to which values to adopt. We may, in the case of a conflict between justice 
and friendship in a relationship, be able to decide upon a course of action which we 
hope will maximise the good and minimise the bad (Gray 2000, 36). In this way, our 
judgments on the values we adopt and those we reject are ‘practical, not logical’ 
(Gray 2000, 54) nor ‘arbitrary’. ‘Our histories and circumstances, our needs and 
goals, may give good reasons for different choices’ (Gray 2000, 36). Elsewhere, 
Gray’s explanation of this is generally implicit and, as such, is difficult to pin down. 
While a ‘good’ life can seemingly be achieved through adopting values pertinent to 
circumstance, Gray also cites another form of choice.  
 
In cases where reference to circumstance, whether environmental, cultural or 
social, is difficult, perhaps with competing pulls, we may be led to ‘radical choice’. 
By this Gray means that we ‘choose the kind of life we mean to have’ (Gray 2000, 65) 
though not necessarily the one we will have in reality. Gray associates this second 
form of choice with modern, pluralist societies, where the competing and 
contradictory demands of life, and unpredictable contingencies of choice, make 
initial, practical decisions impractical. These decisions concern both the selection of 
values and the application of values. That is, individuals will, on occasion, be unable 
to decide whether to pursue justice or friendship without reference to some arbitrary, 
subjective prejudice. On other occasions, individuals will be unable to know which 
action will maximise their chosen value or even recognise that their interest lies in the 
good of flourishing. In all such cases, choice is bereft of reason or rationality. It is 
instinctive. Often, radical choice may simply be a point of entry into an unknown 
circumstance. It is assumed that when knowledge of the circumstance increases, so 
too does the possibility of practical reason. If our instinctive ‘radical’ choices do not 
produce optimal flourishing within a circumstance, we have reason to alter our 
original choices and adopt different values (Gray 2000, 59-60). 
 
While Plato and Gray may disagree about whether the good can meaningfully 
be discussed separately from its ‘existence’ in the ‘sensible world’, both seem to agree 
that there is an objective measure by which to evaluate lives. The Good being a Form 
for Plato, however, necessitates an explanation for how ‘goodness’ exists within the 





14 See the section on Platonic justice under the subheading ‘virtues’. 




                                                
The system of ‘participation’16 explains the relationship between material 
objects and their characteristics and corresponding immaterial Forms. That is, the 
method by which material things from the ‘sensible world’ can interact with their 
archetypes, or universals in the ‘intelligible world’.  
 
The system enables the Forms, which are indivisible, immaterial, and above 
all, singular, to appear in a multiplicity of concepts and material objects, as is clearly 
necessary in order to explain plurality in the material world. The Parmenides contains 
the most detailed metaphysical examination of participation, and the Forms as a 
whole, while also casting the most doubt over the theory. Without entering into a 
detailed discussion of participation, it is sufficient to say that Plato wishes to claim 
that the Forms can retain their unity, as universals or paradigms, while also explaining 
their presence in the pluralistic sensible world. He argues that objects show 
characteristics of Forms by partaking in them, without actually taking some of their 
essence or the Form existing directly within the object. In the Republic, the analogy of 
the Sun suggests that the Good almost reflects itself and the shadow of the other 
Forms onto, and into, the sensible world. This highlights the possibility that many 
things in the material world can participate in one Form. Indeed the system itself 
requires that no one thing has a monopoly over access to the Forms. The Forms 
cannot exist directly within an object, as they then cease to be Form-like; that is, 
indivisible, atemporal, homogeneous and immaterial. This allows for many sensible 
things to exist which display the same Form characteristics. In the Symposium, one 
theory which emerges from Socrates’ discussion with Diotima of Mantinea (201d-
212c) is that in order for one to access the generic Form of Beauty, one must perceive 
them in many material objects, in a quasi-inductive process. There is no explicit 
reason for ‘Good’, which is, in fact, usually associated with the Form of Beauty, or 
‘Value’, to be exempt from this. Indeed, even if it were to be argued in monistic style 
that only the philosopher lives a truly good life, this still could not account for the 
plurality of good lived by the plurality of philosophers. 
  
This can be expanded onto an even larger scale. The archetypal Forms in 
themselves, as separate entities, may be singular. However, it necessarily follows that 
a plurality of Forms exists in order to explain the different aesthetic and ethical 
qualities present in the sensible world and even within the intelligible world itself. 
There may only be one Form of the Good but, as Socrates acknowledges, since it is 
necessarily the case and an integral part of his schema, there are also Forms of 
Beauty, Large, Tall (Phaedo 102e) Unique, Plurality/Multitude (Parm. 129b-e) and so 
on. Indeed the system of participation is specifically designed to cope with the 
apparent co-existence within material objects of differing Form characteristics. The 
Form of Plurality may even be said to hold a vital role in this system. 
  
As I have mentioned, I do not intend to defend the merits, or investigate the 
vagaries of the system of participation. It is only necessary for my argument that Plato 
believed in a system through which some form of plurality in values is accounted for 
and accepted. However, there is one area of controversy which needs to be discussed. 
There has been a long running debate about whether the Forms describe universals, as 
 




                                                
seems to have been intended originally by Socratic ‘Ideas’, or whether they are 
paradigms. If they are universals, then participation necessarily entails that the Form 
characteristics present in the sensible world are identical, in practice, to those of the 
Forms themselves. For example, if there are many men all participating in the Form of 
Man, it is difficult to believe that Plato could argue that they didn’t all partake 
equally. In contrast, if the Forms are paradigms, then the system would admit of 
degree. For example, one could display a characteristic of ‘quite tall’, while the Form 
displays simply a perfect Tallness. In relation to the current discussion, if the Forms 
are regarded as universals then the classes, if properly ordered and partaking in the 
Good, would display an equal amount of that Good. However, if they are paradigms, 
with the sensible goodness subject to gradation, then this allows for the classes to be 
evaluated. 
 
While not providing positive argument for value-pluralist tendencies in the 
Republic, the system of participation does not prohibit plurality. Indeed, it may 
necessitate it, even within a system which proposes the presence of the objective 
Good. If he hopes to retain logical credibility, Gray need have no quarrel with the 
concept of a singular Good.  
 
Value-pluralism is not a form of relativism. As far as Gray is concerned, 
‘ultimate human values’ are not relative or subjective. Rather, they are ‘objective but 
irreducibly diverse’ (Gray 1995b, 1) and are the grounding for human life. As Jones 
(2006, 190) states, value-pluralism is a philosophical model ‘rooted in objective 
human needs and interests’ with flourishing as their ultimate desire or appetite. There 
are certain similarities between this perfectionist aspect of value-pluralism and 
Millian utilitarianism.17 Indeed, Gray sees the revision of happiness into flourishing 
as the logical consequence of the ‘potential infinity’ of good lives engendered by 
different values which may, or may not, promote or acknowledge happiness: 
 
Common experience and the evidences of history show human beings thriving 
in forms of life that are very different from one another. None can reasonably 
claim to embody the flourishing that is uniquely human. If there is anything 
distinctive about the human species, it is that it can thrive in a variety of ways. 
(Gray 2000, 21) 
 
Gray’s theory cannot stand without a concept of a meta-value of good or ‘flourishing’. 
Without this concept, the ‘truth’, or ‘fact’, of pluralism would simply disappear. The 
only method by which Gray can perceive that many societies flourish in many 
different ways is to evaluate them in terms of this meta-value. This meta-value, 
however, can be incorporated into life in a number of different ways through 
dedication to a number of different values. Gray believes that we must accept that the 
best we can hope for is a good life which seeks to minimise evil and maximise good 
pragmatically. This requires that we live by values that compliment, rather than 
 
17 It has sometimes been argued that Plato has Utilitarian tendencies (Mabbott 1978, 57-65). Despite 
received opinion claiming the Republic to be eudaimonistic, the reliance on happiness that this 
necessitates is, in my opinion, too contentious. In the Kallipolis, even the philosopher kings are said to 




confront, environmental circumstance. The values remain incommensurable, but the 
goods and level of flourishing they produce differ according to circumstance. 
Therefore, so long as the frame of reference is identical, it is possible to rank lives 
against each other according to the pertinence of the values and the level to which 
they are actualised (Gray 2000, 42). 
 
To illustrate this, Gray (1996, 154) cites the example of ‘Asian immigrants in 
Western liberal cultures, many of whom have done better than their host populations 
by any standard apart from that which invokes peculiarly Western ideals of autonomy 
and individuality’. Their values have, in this particular circumstance, led to greater 
flourishing than the liberal values of Westerners which may have precluded the 
acquisition of more valuable goods from other sources and engendered evils alien to 
the migrants. Therefore, while the values involved are incommensurable, the lives are 
not; one gleans a greater amount of the good from its set of values than the other. 
However, the values which are pertinent to one environment may be completely alien 
to, and injurious in, another. Hence, ‘It is easy to understand that polygamy might be 
right and monogamy wrong in the societies from which the Old Testament comes, 
while monogamy could be right and polygamy wrong in modern times’ (Gray 2000, 
55-56). 
 
Gray’s examples of values are relatively vague. He could never provide a 
complete, concrete list, as, through experience of societal plurality, there seems to be 
an indefinite number of them. In Plato, if we were to equate these values to ‘value-
Forms’, a similar outcome may result. Forms, at least in the Republic, may logically 
include all of those discussed by Gray. Friendship, obedience, respect, piety and 
efficiency all exist within our world, and therefore, at least in the Republic, must exist 
in the intelligible world. It is not these values which are evaluated as being good, bad 
or indifferent; it is their application in life. Indeed, Plato provides an example of this 
early in the dialogue. In the nascent stages of the attempt to define Justice, Socrates 
sums up Cephalus’ suggested definition, inspired by Simonides, as ‘speaking the truth 
and paying whatever debts one has incurred’ (Rep. 331c). Socrates’ challenge centres 
on the inherent conflict between certain values. He argues that 
 
Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and 
then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn’t return 
them, and wouldn’t be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to 
tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind. (Rep. 331c) 
 
What emerges most strikingly from this is not the challenge to this definition of acting 
justly, but, in fact, a ‘value-pluralist’ empirical observation. Here, just as in Gray’s 
world, we find values, namely friendship, equity and truthfulness, all of which 
conflict. Friendship would usually require that one be equitable and truthful with 
one’s friends. However, in the situation posited, circumstance requires that one 
cannot. Just as for Gray, the values are of incommensurable worth. Both produce 
goods in distinct circumstances, and it is circumstance which enables evaluation. 
 
For Gray, when deciding which values produce the greatest good, most 




                                                
find this to be an easier task. With their access to the world of the Forms, not only are 
they able to understand the Good, they also have the capacity to understand which 
values best suit their environment and, therefore, the way to live the best life 
according to their circumstance. This would leave other groups at a disadvantage, 
almost having to guess how to live their ‘good’ lives. In Gray’s terms, the philosopher 
would always be able to make informed choices, while the other classes might 
generally have to rely on instinctive decision making with parallels to ‘radical 
choice’. I do not believe that Plato would argue that these choices are necessarily bad, 
despite the absence of reason. Plato seems sufficiently consequentialist to regard the 
value of choices to be dependent upon the goods achieved by their implementation.18 
So long as the auxiliaries and money-makers ended up in their appropriate social 
positions, reason would have no independent value in their choices. However, reason 
would be of value in maximising the ends appropriate to each aspect of the soul. That 
is, reason would enable a philosopher to recognise that the value of honour would not 
be best served by leadership. Here, reason acts as a natural corrective to instinct in 
those unable to recognise the good.  
 
A similar situation may exist for Gray. In his more culturally diverse world, 
some still have an advantage. If a Westerner were suddenly to find himself in the 
Papuan rainforest or the Kalahari Desert, it is likely that he would find it difficult to 
flourish or thrive as fully as the locals. Initially, at least, it is likely that his ignorance 
of circumstance would ensure that some decisions were grounded in instinct or 
prejudice. These radical choices would be bereft of reason. However, over time it is 
possible that he would have the capacity to develop knowledge of circumstance and 
be able to adopt new, pertinent, values to suit the new circumstances, perhaps 
sacrificing possible values of honesty and pacifism. Similarly, if Papuan tribesman or 
Kalahari Bushmen found themselves in the West, they would be unable to flourish 
without adaptation and would have to rely on radical choice to survive – whether or 
not they are able to recognise the good of flourishing. There are cases in which 
migrants’ values are naturally suited to a new circumstance, as in the case of Asian 
immigrants to the West (Gray 1996, 154). However, contra Plato, this need not mean 
that they possess immanent faculties of reason above and beyond those of other 
humans. Rather, it suggests that a group of individuals with fundamentally similar 
(basic/biological) needs, and a fundamentally similar end (flourishing), have, in part 
by chance, inherited a series of values appropriate to a particular circumstance. 
 
At first, such emphasis on contingency and radical choice seems to drive a 
wedge between Plato and Gray. Success in Gray can be bereft of reason whereas, in 
Plato, it is clear that the philosophers, with their well-ordered souls, encapsulate the 
best life. The philosophers, as I argued above, have the natural advantage of being 
able to experience the Forms. They therefore have the ‘best natures’ (Rep. 431c) 
because they are best able, in their ideal state, to choose a life that produces good 
from their surroundings. They can therefore maximise their goods, minimise their 
‘bads’ and, perhaps, have the potential to flourish most easily or fully. While Gray 
appears to reject arguments grounded in immanent differences, there are aspects of his 
 
18 I return to the implications of radical choice for the non-philosopher classes in the section on ‘The 




                                                
work which suggest socially constructed individual differences in reason. For Gray, 
there is a sense in which some may be able to flourish more than others through 
knowledge of the truth of pluralism. In this, the value pluralist - for example Gray - 
could be equated to a philosopher ruler. Because he has knowledge of the ‘truth of 
pluralism’, he is less likely to seek conflict with those who have chosen a different 
life. While the source of this enlightenment is unclear, it is apparent that immanent 
differences are rejected. However, the consequence of the differences - immanent or 
derived - seems similar.  
 
In order for modus vivendi to be effective, it may be necessary for value 
pluralists to demonstrate the truth, and value, of pluralism to those who might 
otherwise come into conflict. With clear parallels to the activity of the philosophers in 
the Kalipolis, Jones (2006, 96) asks: 
 
How then should the value-pluralist respond to the possibility that ways of life 
that he identifies as good may be ways of life that find one another 
unacceptable? His most obvious option, qua value-pluralist, is to disabuse the 
bearers of those ways of life of their objections to one another. In other words, 
his most obvious recourse is to lead them out of their caves and inform or 
remind them of what the world is really like. Once they are dragged into the 
external world of value pluralism, they will see that their condemnation of 
others’ forms of life is misplaced. That will solve by dissolving the problem of 
toleration, or it will if people can be induced to take their corrected 
conceptions of the world with them when they return to their particular ways 
of life. 
 
I attempt to give substance to the apparent parallel between the philosophers and the 
value pluralists in a study of the dialectical forms of government below. Here, 
however, I shall concentrate on the consequences of revelation.  
 
Jones (2006, 96) highlights the problem that if one were to bring those in 
conflict to the truth, they might then find their life unliveable. Devout monotheists 
may find it difficult, if not impossible, to return to worship of a God who, if existent 
at all, is certainly only one of many. For Gray, these lives may be based on ‘illusion’19 
(Jones 2006, 196), but can still contribute to flourishing. That is why Gray believes 
that the truth of pluralism may have to be hidden, with most believing their life, 
through self-delusion, to be better than another. As Jones (2006, 196) argues, for 
Gray, ‘a world in which everyone was persuaded of value-pluralism might not be a 
better world.’20 
  
For Plato, a similar problem arises. There is nothing in nature to guarantee that 
the money-makers and auxiliaries would instinctively follow the philosopher ruler. 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that they would without systemic, societal or cultural 
 
19 Gray claims that ‘Humans cannot live without illusions’ and that ‘Illusion is our natural condition’ 
(2003, 29, 81). 




                                                
intervention.21 While Gray might deal with this through a split level view of the world 
(Jones 2006, 196), with the truth of pluralism acting as a subconscious to the 
conscious of their own morals, Plato posits a solution of almost reinventing a cultural 
history to which all would refer. This is the noble falsehood.22 In this system, not only 
is each citizen exposed to the truth of pluralism, with a mythical reason not to pursue 
just the role of the philosopher, but all are also given the guidance they need in order 




Metaphysically, the adoption of multiple value-Forms by individuals within 
Plato, as discussed above, is one way of equating his schema to Gray’s. Another area 
discussed within the Republic, and one which allows another potential analogical 
discussion is that of virtue and its division. 
 
The division of the Soul in the Republic and, subsequently, the Kallipolis’ 
citizenry, is based on the sub-division of virtue.23 Plato decides that there are four 
virtues in total: wisdom, moderation, courage and justice.24 The first two correspond 
to the predominant characteristic of two of the classes: wisdom to that of the true 
guardian philosopher rulers and courage to the spirited guardian auxiliaries. 
Moderation, while distributed amongst the entire citizenry, seems to affect the money-
making artisans most. The last virtue, justice, provides the greatest insight. He claims: 
 
So what kind of virtue is left, then, that makes the city share even further in 
virtue? Surely, it’s clear that it is justice.… We stated, and often repeated… 
that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is 
naturally best suited.… It seems, then, that the power that consists in 
everyone’s doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its 
contribution to the virtue of the city… Meddling and exchange between these 
three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would 
rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it… And wouldn’t you 
say that the worst thing that someone could do to his city is injustice?... Then, 
that exchange and meddling is injustice. (Rep. IV: 432b-434c) 
 
Justice, then, is necessarily dependent on a pluralistic system. Justice cannot exist as a 
concept without distinct characteristics to balance. The first three virtues are good 
values in some sense, in that together they contribute to the meta-value of the Good.25 
One may infer a hierarchy with wisdom at the top. However, this may only be as a 
result of wisdom being required by the ruling class.26 Indeed, Plato claims simply that 
 
21 The degenerate forms of government (Rep. VIII-X) demonstrate this. 
22 Republic (II: 382a ff.); (III: 414d-415c). 
23 The process of virtue analysis takes place throughout Book IV. For more details on virtue in the 
Republic see Irwin (1977, 195-200). 
24 In Protgaoras (330b) he adds a fifth, namely, piety/holiness. 
25 See Republic (VI 504d-505e) and Irwin (1977, 224). 
26 As I stated earlier, the philosopher king is seemingly in no better position than the others to achieve 





                                                
the philosopher class is the only one that is fit to rule. He does not state that they 
would be a better soldier or, indeed, money-maker.27 All of the virtues are necessary, 
and all perform incommensurable tasks, though perhaps some are more beneficial in 
the Platonic environment than others. Indeed, while the class which corresponds to 
wisdom, the philosopher, rules in the Kallipolis, it still has to be in balance with the 
rest. While the guardians would exert control over the others, this is simply because 
they are the only class which possesses knowledge of the truth and, therefore, the 
correct way to go about life. As I have previously argued, this may mean that the 
philosopher kings posses a more concrete knowledge of how to flourish using their 
value. The other classes, without the help of the philosophers, may have to resort to 
radical choice. 
 
In his good polis, it seems perverse to say that those who cannot philosophise 
are simply bad. They perform necessary societal functions which, among other things, 
allow the philosopher kings to philosophise and rule. This is demonstrated by the very 
existence of a corresponding dominant part of the soul in each group. Plato does not 
claim that these lives or aspects of the soul are bad. Rather, the different groups are 
each living good lives because they are being just, if not in a psychological then at 
least a civil sense;28 that is, abiding by what they are good at, and leaving those who 
are fit to, to philosophise. As Plato claims, ‘we aren’t all born alike… each of us 
differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to 
another’ (Rep. II: 370a). However, despite their necessity, Plato does clearly attempt 
at least some ranking of virtues. In terms of reason, one could argue that since virtues 
are used instrumentally to actualise the Good, it is much more likely that this will 
perform its function, having such a direct correlation to the meta-value. Similarly, for 
Gray, while such values as friendship and truth may often be incommensurable, one 
such as peace, which corresponds quite often to flourishing, may be given some 
primacy. Indeed, as Jones (2006, 191) states ‘As a general position, value-pluralism 
admits of degree. We may recognise that values can be incongruent and 
incommensurable but hold that they exhibit these properties only rarely.’ For Plato, 
although reason is so often best in terms of actualising the Good in the sensible world, 
something like honour may be required in order to force the philosophers to return to 
the cave instead of staying in the world of Forms, which seems perfectly rational in 
order to pursue their value, wisdom. 
 
The pluralist interpretation of the virtues is given further credence by Plato’s 
analysis of the soul in Timaeus. Here, he emphasises the necessity of the jobs that the 
other, ‘less rational’, parts of the soul perform. Johansen (2000, 105) argues that the 
description of the soul in the Timaeus differs from that in the Republic only in 
‘emphasis’. He claims that while the parts of the soul are analogous, if not identical, 
to those in the Republic, Plato is here attempting to demonstrate that instead of them 
‘having desires that contrast with the desire of reason for truth and wisdom [they] 
rather [have] desires which themselves serve a rational end’. The spirited part 
cooperates with reason, and carries out its orders, and the appetitive part has 
 
27 He does, however, claim that they can enjoy some of the satisfaction of the other parts of their soul, 
in a way that the other classes cannot enjoy knowledge (Rep. 582a-b). 




                                                
necessary desires so that the whole may live. Indeed, ‘the appetitive part has a 
perception of rational commands which is mediated through the images projected by 
the intellect on to the liver.’ The appetites for wisdom and for food ‘are both rational 
desires in the sense that they are desires for our real good.’ Similarly, he argues that  
 
the Republic by no means always presents the lower parts of the soul as being 
in conflict with the intellect. The argument to show that the individual will be 
happy only if all parts of the soul are harmonized under the rule of reason 
surely presupposes that the lower parts of the soul are fundamentally able to 
co-operate with ends that have been determined by reason (Johansen 2000, 
105-106). 
 
On this model, reason has to be in control, as in the just soul of the Republic. This, as 
I have explained, need not be a stark divergence from Gray. Reason is simply best 
suited to being in control. However, the soul is necessarily29 embodied, at least for 
now, and therefore has to have desires that are necessary to keep the body alive. The 
less rational parts of the soul are therefore used as an intermediary with the body for 
this very purpose. Indeed, they absorb affections, desires and perceptions, and the 
resulting rectilinear motions, to allow the rational part to pursue reason less hindered 
and to retain ‘divine’ circular motions.  
  
Up until this point, I have discussed Platonic theory in the Republic more as a 
way of demonstrating the pluralistic tendencies in Plato’s metaphysical ethics. Now I 
shall discuss the value-pluralist application of the Kallipolis as a modus vivendi. 
 
The ‘Kallipolis’ as a Grayan ‘modus vivendi’ 
 
Gray would find great difficulty in accepting the notion of utopian city to suit 
all societies. This is especially true if, as in the Kallipolis, the ideal disregards local 
environmental circumstance and tradition.30 Indeed, much of his argument focuses on 
criticism of the Western liberal belief that people of all cultures can coexist simply 
because of putatively intrinsic ‘shared’ values. Liberalism, and its values of 
autonomy, individuality and freedom, ‘embody only one way of life among many’, 
‘are in no sense underwritten by history and have no claim to embody the permanent 
interests of the species’ (Gray 1996, 157, 158). Value-pluralists recognise that 
‘universal values are realised in a variety of different ways in different cultures’ (Raz 
1998, 204). 
 
For Gray (1996, 158), the truth of this statement is demonstrated by the 
persistence of non-liberal orders against the teleological prophesies of Mill and Marx, 
and the efforts of liberal ‘missionaries’ to inculcate liberalism in pre-modern regions. 
Such Enlightenment activists are not merely wrong; they actually harm non-liberals 
by refusing to accept the plurality of good lives (Gray 1996, 154; 1997, 91-92). 
Moreover, they demonstrate that their attachment to liberal values is independent ‘of 
their contribution to personal well-being and even – sometimes – in competition with 
 
29 See Johansen (2000) for his discussion of what is entailed by the term ‘necessary’ in this dialogue. 




it’ (Gray 1996, 142). Gray argues that the error these individuals make, is to believe 
that some values are intrinsically more valuable than others when they are, in fact, 
‘incommensurable; that is, they are not comparable by any rational measure’ (Gray 
1995b, 1). They each contribute to good lives in different ways, and it is impossible to 
consider, for example, whether justice is intrinsically more valuable than friendship 
(Gray 2000, 42). 
 
Despite this, there may be more value to elicit from the polis. Although Gray 
would argue that it cannot be prescribed to all societies, it may be one example of 
modus vivendi. That is, a method of co-existence for people who follow different, and 
sometimes conflicting, values. It is especially effective, as modus vivendi  
 
entail[s] a population’s possessing and recognising common institutions 
through which they can negotiate compromises between their different values 
and interests.  The more successfully these institutions provide for negotiation 
and compromise, the better the modus vivendi. (Jones 2006, 192) 
 
In the Kallipolis, there are three different classes. During wartime, it could not be 
guaranteed that the money-making class would be provided with the necessary 
commodities and trading system in order to produce goods. These raw materials may 
be required by the auxiliaries for weapons or supplies. Indeed the money-makers may 
even be forced to abandon production of monetarily valuable goods in order to create 
the weapons required by the auxiliaries. Both classes are pursuing their goals based on 
their values, but neither may desire to help the other. In Plato’s ‘modus vivendi’, this 
is catered for. The acceptance of the noble falsehood by the populace should mean 
that all already understand the importance of cooperation. For the safety of the 
society, the money-makers may need temporarily to divert their efforts away from 
pursuing their own form of flourishing in order to aid another’s, and that of the 
society as a whole. With rulers able to understand objectively what is better for the 
society (that is, the option which produces the most good while avoiding the most 
bad, i.e. the majority losing out on their flourishing) the system is able to continue, 
progress, and flourish. Similarly, Gray claims that: 
 
The aim of modus vivendi cannot be to still the conflict of values. It is to 
reconcile individuals and ways of life honouring conflicting values to a life in 
common. We do not need common values in order to live together in peace. 
We need common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist. (Gray 
2000, 5-6). 
 
Taken in this frame of reference, it is also possible to account for the received opinion 
of the philosopher rulers living the ‘best’ life. Gray’s value-pluralism, as I have stated, 
can account for different levels of flourishing, so long as the frame of reference is 
identical, according to the pertinence of the values and the level to which they are 
actualised. For example, within the Kallipolis, the philosopher may sometimes 
perform the most important tasks, according to the environmental requirements. In 
this circumstance, he may be said to have flourished most fully. This may generally 
be the case within the Kallipolis and its necessary requirements. However, while Plato 




intrinsically suited to doing so, it seems likely that there may occasionally be a ‘bad’ 
philosopher Indeed he even claims that a ‘golden’ individual can produce someone of 
‘silver’ character. This seems to show, with Plato’s focus on eugenics in mind, that 
even philosophers may have some imbalanced immanent characteristics that can be 
passed on. In this situation, the philosopher would somehow not be balanced, and 
perhaps even pursue the wrong values for his role. It seems perverse that Plato could 
call this ‘unbalanced’ philosopher better than a ‘perfectly’ balanced auxiliary. 
 
For Gray, the Kallipolis could only ever be suited to a particular situation - 
perhaps the one envisaged by Plato in Classical Greece. However, there are value-
pluralists, such as Crowder (2002), who do regard certain political settlements as 
legitimate in every situation. Crowder argues that liberalism is the system best placed 
to allow and encourage individuals to pursue as many values for the good as possible, 
while protecting against those which nurture the bad. Here, the desire to encourage 
pluralism is not accompanied by a plurality of political orders. Indeed, Crowder’s 
societal monism does not necessarily preclude the possibility that philosophers are 
best placed to define the boundaries of pluralism. If pluralism is good only insofar as 
it enables individuals to pursue a path to flourishing which is appropriate to their 
characteristics and circumstances, it follows that reason may be an extremely 
important aspect of governance. The Kallipolis, while perhaps not permitting 
individuals to follow as many values as Crowdian liberalism, certainly allows 
individuals to pursue those values which best suit their personal and environmental 
circumstances. Logically, it may be difficult for Crowder to argue that this does not 
allow individuals to follow as many values as possible without deleterious effects. As 
Plato claims:  
 
can’t we confidently assert that those desires of even the money-loving and 
honour-loving parts that follow knowledge and argument and pursue with their 
help those pleasures that reason approves will attain the truest pleasures 
possible for them, because they follow truth, and the ones that are most their 
own. (Rep. 586d-e) 
 
In a communitarian society, such as the Kallipolis, harming the society is analogous 
to harming oneself in a liberal system, and vice versa. In Millian liberalism, the state 
is obliged to intervene only when individuals harm others and when that harm 
outweighs the harm of intervention. In Plato’s organic society, self-harm is almost as 
deleterious to others as oneself because it leads to societal disintegration. This societal 
deterioration forms the basis for much of the latter part of the dialogue, and also 
provides opportunity to discuss why this may similarly be deleterious for the value-
pluralist. 
 
The Dialectical forms of Government 
 
Late in the Republic, Plato discusses the various political systems employed 
by poleis. Plato favours aristocracy, as this is the basis for his Kallipolis. This denotes 
a society in which those who are best suited to rule do so. He proceeds to describe the 
system and corresponding soul type of timocracy/timarchy (that is, a system of class 




widened into democracy and, finally, degenerates into tyranny (Rep. VIII-X). His 
apparent ranking of the four systems - all of which are unsustainable - with timocracy 
at the top, and tyranny at the bottom, seems to demonstrate a fundamental rejection of 
‘non-ideal’ forms of society. This apparent ignorance of diversity of circumstance is 
the fundamental source of Gray’s objection to Platonic thought. However, Gray bases 
his theory on experience of a modern, pluralist world. Plato, writing from a more 
monistic historical circumstance, still aimed, along with Gray, to ensure that 
individuals and societies pursue values and lives most fitting to their circumstance. In 
Greece philosophy was often viewed as important, and the region acted as the seat of 
learning for the Western world. Not only this, but, as Plato claims, only the 
philosophers were seen to possess the necessary knowledge of the truth to be able to 
lead. Such a belief seems, even attitudinally, extremely similar to Gray’s belief that it 
is only the value-pluralist who is able to intervene in conflict and monist cultures due 
to his knowledge of the truth of pluralism. However, it may be that circumstance leads 
value-pluralists to the truth, just as ‘ideal’ circumstances lead philosophers to rule. 
 
In the Kallipolis, the philosophers are in control because circumstances most 
befit their values and needs; that is, the pursuit of knowledge, bravery and honesty. In 
the timocracy, however, Plato claims that those who love honour necessarily gain 
control. In the democracy, decision making power is spread even to those who have 
no interest in the good of the polis, and, in the tyranny, the tyrant has all power, is 
usually simply physically the strongest, and despises the selflessness of the 
philosopher. These societies have completely unjust compositions. Those who have 
no fitness to rule gain power through social discord, and the former philosopher rulers 
are left to sophistry, poverty and even death, as with Socrates in the Athenian 
democracy. These societies show the least level of flourishing according to 
circumstance. Interestingly, the situation that arises from this is one in which not only 
the philosophers but also the other classes suffer. It is in this that radical choice comes 
to the fore.  
 
The timocrat, who loves honour, has made a ‘radical choice’ to fulfil his desire 
and actualise his value by ruling, rather than, say, by defending those who need it; for 
example, by becoming an auxiliary. Perhaps he thinks that his new position gives him 
the greatest possibility for performing acts which accrue honour, or that he might 
simply force his subjects to give him what he desires. Instead, he becomes hated 
because of the wealth and possessions he accrues and he loses both respect and 
power. Circumstance determines his course of life to be different to that which he 
chose. He does this because he cannot perceive the Good, and the true philosopher is 
no longer in a position to provide him with guidance. For both Plato and Gray this 
kind of radical choice, as I have previously stated, is sometimes good and sometimes 
bad - it is simply unpredictable. For Plato, it is bad when someone makes a decision to 
become something to which they are not suited. He claims: 
 
I suppose that when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind 
of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of vote, or by 
his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class 
of soldiers, or one of the unworthy soldiers tries to enter that of the judges and 




tries to do all these things at once, then I think you’ll agree that these 
exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin. (Rep. IV: 434b) 
 
However, that is not to say that they would always do this, with individuals usually 
choosing professions to which they are best suited. Gray faces a similar problem, but 
claims that circumstance, and reason which allows individuals to judge this, usually 
dictates that people abandon their radical choice if it is contradictory to their situation. 
Indeed, he even states that ‘radical choices occur as crises in ethical life, not as 
normal episodes within it’ (2000, 65). Such crises, for Plato, are very often deleterious 
and should be avoided through the construction of an ideal state governed by reason. 
Operating in a world in flux, Gray argues that, so long as modus vivendi are governed 
by the truth of pluralism, individuals will be able to work through their crises by 
interaction with circumstance. For Plato on the other hand, this is only the case if the 




In this paper I have attempted to demonstrate that while there are fundamental 
distinctions between the schemata of Plato and Gray, there are many key areas in 
which ideas are shared. Neither thinker is an unalloyed ethical monist or pluralist. 
Gray undermines his pluralism by appealing to a monist meta-value or condition of 
‘flourishing’. Conversely, Plato undermines his monist belief in the ideal state by 
upholding the necessity for distinct and incommensurable parts of the soul, city and 
virtue. He does not propose the notion that only philosophers exist in a utopian polis, 
and sees at least some good in the activities of other members of the society. The 
philosophers do have some sort of advantage. They hold a value which is most likely 
to lead to flourishing and are able to perceive the Forms and so judge what is good 
according to their relevant value and circumstance. Gray also discusses immanent 
aspects of the individual, though less explicitly, and clearly feels that the value-
pluralist is less likely to come into conflict with a clear concept of the truth of 
pluralism. The key distinction seems to lie in the thinkers’ respective notions of what 
is uniquely human. While Gray’s concept of human nature is malleable and almost 
indefinable, though perhaps with some shared fundamental characteristics based on 
needs, Plato’s is clear. What is uniquely human is rationality, though this is not what 
is entirely human. As Plato accepts, humans still necessarily have other parts - the 
spirit and the appetite - and these are by no means intrinsically bad. 
 
The Kallipolis demonstrates a society which may seem problematic to Gray, 
with the philosophers able to judge and prescribe how to live good lives. However, it 
is actually a system in which the majority are able to follow their own values to the 
maximum allowable extent without major conflict, discord, or civil breakdown. With 
an agreement, justified through the noble falsehood, that the philosophers should be in 
control, the truth of pluralism would be enforced even on those who disagreed, with 
the result that no one should be able to claim outright that their role is the most 
important or good. While Raz, Berlin and Crowder may have difficulties with such an 
aristocratic system, they cannot deny that the majority are able to follow their own 





Gray and Plato undoubtedly see certain areas of ethics very differently. 
However, the fact that both are clearly ‘situationalists’, believe pluralism, in some 
sense, to be beneficial, and see values instrumentally as a method of actualising the 
good, demonstrates that the categories of monism and pluralism are not as distinct as 
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